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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Volume 48, Number 3, 1973

ARTICLES

EQUALITY FOR SPOUSES IN
WASHINGTON COMMUNITY PROPERTY
LAW-1972 STATUTORY CHANGES
Harry M. Cross*
INTRODUCTION
The past two decades have witnessed an expanded drive for equal
treatment before the law.' Although courts, using the fourteenth
amendments equal protection hammer, have built coffins for discrimination based on race, lineage, and financial status, centuries-old discrimination based on sex largely has avoided legal interment. 2 However, the need for change recently has been recognized by both the
* Professor of Law, University of Washington; B.A., Washington State University,
1936; J.D., University of Washington, 1940.
The authorwishes to express his appreciation to Harvey H. Chamberlin, third year
law student, University of Washington; B.A., 1970, University of Washington; who collaborated in the writing of this article'
1. See generally Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv.
1065 (1969).
2. A March 1970 memorandum of the Citizens' Advisory Council on the Status of
Women lists 15 specific areas of sex discrimination:
1. State laws placing special restrictions on women with respect to hours of work
and weightlifting on the job;
2. State laws prohibiting women from working in certain occupations;
3. Laws or practices operating to exclude women from state colleges and universities (including higher standards required for women applicants to institutions of
higher learning and in the administration of scholarship programs);
4. Discrimination in employment by state and local governments;
5. Dual pay schedules for men and women public school teachers;
6. State laws providing for alimony to be awarded, under certain circumstances, to
ex-wives but not to ex-husbands;
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commentators3 and lawmakers. In November 1972 voters in Washington adopted an amendment to the Washington Constitution which
4
provides:
(1) Equality of rights and responsibility under the law shall not be
denied or abridged on account of sex.
(2) The legislature shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
In addition, 30 states have ratified an amendment to the United States
Constitution which provides that equality of rights under the law shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on ac-

7. State laws placing special restrictions on the legal capacity of married women
or their capacity to establish a legal domicile;
8. State laws that require married women but not married men to go through
formal procedure and obtain court approval before they may engage in an independent business;
9. Social Security and other social benefits legislation which give greater benefits
to one sex than the other;
10. Discriminatory preferences, based on sex, in child custody cases;
11. State laws providing that the father is the natural guardian of minor children;
12. Different ages for males and females in (a) child labor laws, (b) eligibility for
marriage, (c) cutoff of the right to parental support, and (d) juvenile court jurisdiction;
13. Exclusion of women from the requirements of the Military Selective Service
Act of 1967;
14. Special sex-based exemptions for women in selection of state juries;
15. Heavier criminal penalties for female offenders than for male offenders committing the same crime.
116 CONG. REC. 9685 (1970). See also Note, Sex, Discrimination,and the Constitution,
2 STAN. L. REV. 691 (1950).
3. Binerman, Sex Discriminationin the Legal Profession, 55 A.B.AJ. 951 (1969);
Kanowitz, ConstitutionalAspects of Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law, 48
NEB. L. REV. 131 (1968); Miller, Sex Discriminationand Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 51 MINN. L. REV. 877 (1967); Miller & Eastwood, Jane Crow and the
Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232 (1965); Oldham,
Sex Discrimination and State Protective Laws, 44 DENVER LJ. 344 (1967); Seidenberg, The Submissive Majority: Modern Trends in the Law Concerning Women's
Rights, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 262 (1970); Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendment?, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1499 (1971).
Two of the early classics on the subject are H.T. MILL, ENFRANCHISEMENT OF WOMEN
(1851), and J.S. MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN (1869).
In recent years the force and scope of the assault upon discrimination against women
have grown. See, e.g., Cavanaugh, "A Little Dearer Than His Horse": Legal Stereotypes
and the Feminine Personality, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 260 (1971); S.
FIRESTONE, THE DIALECTIC OF SEX (1970); B. FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (1964);

Gilbertson, Women and the Equal ProtectionClause, 20 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 351 (1971);
G. GREER, THE FEMALE EUNUCH (1971); L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW (1969); K.
MILLETT, SEXUAL POLITICS (1970).

4.
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count of sex.5 Further, title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act6 includes

"sex" as an equal employment opportunity classification.

For the most part, however, courts have been unwilling to proclaim
absolute equality between the sexes. 7 Mr. Justice Bradley declared
100 years ago that the "constitution of the family organization, which
is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things,
indicates the domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the
domain and functions of womanhood. '8 In Muller v. Oregon9 the
Supreme Court brought Justice Bradley's social ideas into a legal context and in dicta stated the principle that sex is a valid basis for classification. This principle is sustained in Reed v. Reed.10 discrimination
on the basis of sex is permissible if rationally related to a legitimate
state purpose.
Community property laws 1 ' which discriminate on the basis of sex
heretofore have not received adequate judicial or legislative attention.
By having an ownership share in property acquired by her husband,

5. The proposed amendment reads:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.
HJ.R. Res. 208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); SJ. Res. 8, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
For an excellent analysis of the issues presented by the proposed amendment, see Equal
Rights for Women: A Symposium on the ProposedConstitutionalAmendment, 6 HARv.
Civ. RIGHTs-COv. La.L. REv. 215 (1971) and Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The
Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80
YALE L.J. 871 (1971).

6. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970).
7. See, e.g., Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). See generally Johnston &
Knapp, Sex Discriminationby Law: A Study in JudicialPerspective, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv.
675 (1971). For an account of how the English common law restricted the legal rights of
women, see 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMNMNTARIES *445-46 (1765). Slogans such as "it's a
man's world" and "a woman's place is in the home," have, until recently, been widely
used.
8. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1872).
9. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
10. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Reed, the United States Supreme Court held that an
Idaho statute, which compelled preference for men over women for appointment to
administer a decedents estate where both were members of the same entitlement group,
violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. It is significant that the United States Supreme Court did not hold in Reed that sex
is a suspect classification requiring the state to demonstrate a compelling interest in
order for it to be sustained. On suspect classification generally, see Developments in the
Law, supra note 1, at 1087-1133.
11. In addition to Washington, the following states have adopted the community
property system: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico and
Texas.
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the housewife in a community property jurisdiction is in a position
more favorable than that of her counterpart in a common law jurisdiction. 12 But her status is not one of equality. Most of the management power rests in the husband.' 3 The employed wife in a community property jurisdiction is in a less advantageous position than
her common law counterpart, for the ownership of her acquisitions is
halved and the management of her acquisitions is vested largely in her
husband. The 1972 legislature significantly changed these aspects of
14
Washington community property law.
The 1972 amendments do not alter the requirement that a marital

12. For a brief comparison of the property rights of a wife in a community property
and a noncommunity property jurisdiction, see Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman,
The Equal Rights Amendment: A ConstitutionalBasis for Equal Rightsfor Women, 80
YALE L.J. 871, 946-49 (1971); L. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW 59-69 (1969).
13. See WASH. REV. CODE ch. 26.16. Although equality of ownership is inherent in
community property, prior to the 1972 amendments all management power was delegated to the husband under WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.16.030-.040 (1959). The case law
held that the wife possessed only an "emergency" power of management. See generally
W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 276-79 (2d ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN].
14. Ch. 108 [1972] Wash. Laws, 2d Ex. Sess., WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030, as
amended (1972), provides:
Property not acquired or owned, as prescribed in RCW 26.16.010 and 26.16.020,
acquired after marriage by either husband or wife or both, is community property.
Either spouse, acting alone, may manage and control community property, with a
like power of disposition as the acting spouse has over his or her separate property,
except:
(1) Neither spouse shall devise or bequeath by will more than one-half of the
community property.
(2) Neither spouse shall give community property without the express or implied
consent of the other.
(3) Neither spouse shall sell, convey, or encumber the community real property
without the other spouse joining in the execution of the deed or other instrument by
which the real estate is sold, conveyed, or encumbered, and such deed or other instrument must be acknowledged by both spouses.
(4) Neither spouse shall purchase or contract to purchase community real property without the other spouse joining in the transaction of purchase or in the execution of the contract to purchase.
(5) Neither spouse shall create a security interest other than a purchase money
security interest as defined in RCW 62A.9-107 in, or sell, community household
goods, furnishings, or appliances unless the other spouse joins in executing the security agreement or bill of sale, if any.
(6) Neither spouse shall acquire, purchase, sell, convey, or encumber the assets,
including real estate, or the good will of a business where both spouses participate
in its management without the consent of the other: Provided,That where only one
spouse participates in such management the participating spouse may, in the ordinary course of such business, acquire, purchase, sell, convey or encumber the assets, including real estate, or the good will of the business without the consent of the
nonparticipating spouse.
For additional amendments, see WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.16.140 and 26.16.190 (Supp.
1972).
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relationship exist before there can be community property, 15 or the
presumption that property onerously acquired during marriage is

community property. 16 The general thrust of the legislation is to establish equality between the husband and wife in regard to their community property.1 7 This article analyzes the impact of the 1972
8
amendments on Washington community property law.'
I.

CHARACTER AND MEANS OF ACQUISITION

A.

"Living Separateand Apart"

Prior to the 1972 amendments, a Washington statute provided that
the wife's acquisitions during marriage were her separate property if
she was living separate and apart from her husband at the time of
acquisition.' 9 There was no comparable provision for the husband,
although approximately the same result was achieved through the
Togliatti v. Robertson2 o line of cases. The 1972 amendments adopted
the Togliatti rationale2 ' by expanding the ambit of the statute to in-

15. See, e.g., Poole v. Schrichte, 39 Wn. 2d 558, 236 P.2d 1044 (1951), and Chase v.
Carney, 199 Wash. 99, 90 P.2d 286 (1939).
16. Yesler v. Hochstettler, 4 Wash. 349, 30 P. 398 (1892).
17. Cross, 1972 Amendments to the Washington Community Property Law, 26
WASH. ST. BAR NEWS 9 (April, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Cross, WASH. ST. BAR NEws].

18. This article does not purport to be an exhaustive exposition of Washington
community property law. However, such an article is scheduled to appear in this law
review later this year, and will be authored by Professor Cross and Harvey Chamberlin.
19.

WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.140 formerly read:

The earnings and accumulations of the wife and of her minor children living with
her, or in her custody while she is living separate from her husband, are the separate
property of the wife.
Of the eight community property states, the following have similar statutes: ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 25-213(c) (1956); CAL. Civ. CODE § 5118 (West 1954); IDAHO REV. CODE §

32-909 (1963); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art 2334 (West 1971); NEV. REv. STAT. § 123.180
(1967). See generally DEFuNIAK & VAUGHN at 110-12.

20. In Togliatti v. Robertson, 29 Wn. 2d. 844, 190 P.2d 575 (1948), the court held
that the husband's acquisition, long after he and his wife had permanently separated, was
his separate property. Later cases in which the court followed Togliatti include In re
Armstrong's Estate, 33 Wn. 2d 118, 204 P.2d 500 (1949); Estate of Osicka, I Wn. App.
277, 461 P.2d 585 (1969).
21. A "defunct marriage" presented the factual pattern for the application of the
Togliatti rule, according to the explanations of later cases. See, e.g., Estate of Osicka, I
Wn. App. 277, 461 P.2d 585 (1969). It seems probable that this standard is really
nothing more than "permanent separation" and that the amendment thus is merely codification of the Togliatti rule. For a discussion of the Togliatti rule, see Cross, The
Community Property Law in Washington, 15 LA. L. REV. 640, 656-57 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Cross, LA. L. REV.].
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clude the acquisitions of the husband when living "separate and
22
apart."
The phrase "living separate and apart" is not defined in the statute.
Decisions of other jurisdictions indicate that the bare fact that the
spouses are living in different places does not constitute "living separate and apart" absent marital rift and an intent to separate permanently. In an early case, Tobin v. Galvin,23 the California Supreme
24
Court declared:
A temporary absence of the wife from her husband does not come
within the meaning of the [living Separate and Apart] Act. There
must have been an abandonment on the part of the husband or wife, or
a separation which was intended to befinal.
In Makeig v. United Security Bank and Trust Co.,25 the California
26
Court of Appeals said:
Living separate and apart ... does not apply to a case where a man
and wife are residing temporarily in different places due to economic
or social reasons, but applies to a condition where the spouses have
come to a parting of the ways and have no present intention of resuming the marital relations and taking up life together under the
same roof.
In Makeig, the spouses, although married for 14
years, lived together for only six weeks immediately after their marriage. The wife
spent most of her time in San Francisco as a sales clerk, while the
husband lived in various other cities where he worked as a barber.
Nevertheless, even though the couple seldom cohabited, they regarded
their living apart as only temporary, intending to establish a common
home someday. In a more recent case, Kerr v. Kerr,2 7 the same court
held that a husband who, desiring to resume marital relations with his
wife, left her for fear of being inparcerated in a state mental hospital
22. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.140 (Supp. 1972):
When a husband and wife are living separate and apart, their respective earnings
and accumulations shall be the separate property of each. The earnings and accumulations of minor children shall be the separate property of the spouse who has
their custody or, if no custody award has been made, then the separate property of
the spouse with whom said children are living.
23. 49 Cal. 34 (1874).
24. Id. at 36-37 (emphasis added).
25. 112 Cal. App. 138, 296 P. 673 (1931).
26. 296 P. at 675 (emphasis added).
27.
182 Cal. App. 2d 12, 5 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1960).
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was not "living separate and apart" within the meaning of the statute.
In Succession of Le Jeune2 8 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
spouses were not "living separate and apart" where the husband, suffering from a malady offensive to the wife, lived in a garage located
on the leased premises of the wife "and did not at any time occupy
[her] sleeping quarters ....2 9
The conclusion to be drawn from these and other cases 0 is that
"living separate and apart" requires permanent separation involving
absence of will to live together as man and wife and a lack of present
intention to resume the marital relationship. The cases do not require
an intent to dissolve the marriage by divorce,3 1 but do require more
than a trial separation, since in the latter instance the spouses have not
decided whether to resume living together or to separate permanently.
The trial separation may be temporary for the purpose of resolving
their difficulties so that they can live together in greater harmony.
Although the language of the statute both before and after the
amendment is broad enough to permit a separate property acquisition
by a deserting spouse, it is possible that the permanent separation or
defunct marriage needed to invoke application of the statute requires
concurrence of both spouses in the determination to go their separate
ways, at least to protect the deserted spouse's claim against the individual acquisitions of the deserter. Such a requirement should not be
used to permit the deserter to assert any right in the acquisitions of the
32
other spouse.
The status of property acquired after a permanent separation is
only one of the issues emanating from the "living separate and apart"
situation. Another issue is the question of continuing management of
the community property assets, which will be discussed in section
I1-B, infra.
B.

CreditAcquisitions-Generally
Acquisition of an asset through the extension of credit falls within

28.
29.
30.

221 La. 437, 59 So. 2d 446(1952).
59 So. 2d at 449.
See, e.g., De Maupassant v. Clayton, 214 La. 812, 38 So. 2d 791 (1949), and

Loring v. Stuart, 79 Cal. 200, 21 P. 651 (1889).
31. See, e.g., In re Janssen's Estate, 56 Wn. 2d 150, 351 P.2d 510 (1960).
32.

See DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN at 110-12.
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the general presumption that an asset onerously3 3 acquired is community property. Traditionally, if the husband was the acquirer-debtor,
his obligation was enforceable against the community property presumably by reason of his managing power. 3 4 There was no presumption
that the obligations of the wife bound the community property. 35 Since
the amendments give the wife equal management powers, 3 6 henceforth
her obligations also should be regarded as presumptively community
obligations.
C.

Acquisition of Real Property

Prior to the amendments, the husband in exercising his management powers could contract to buy real property without the concurrence of his wife.37 Under the basic presumption, the acquired asset
would be community property and the obligation to pay would be a
community liability. Also it is probable that the husband acting alone
could have acquired encumbered real property even though it became
encumbered simultaneously with the acquisition, 38 but he could not
encumber or convey real property after acquisition without the wife's
participation. 39 The restriction on conveying and encumbering community real property is continued under paragraph (3) of the new
statute. The new paragraph (4) requiring joint action in acquisition
will preclude acquisition of realty by one spouse whether or not simultaneously encumbered. 4 0 The earlier law permitted an effective encumbrance or transfer of community real property if the wife "par-

33. A property right or asset is "onerous" when "the obligations attaching to it
counter-balance or exceed the advantage to be derived from it ....
BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1241 (rev. 4th ed. 1968). Thus, acquisition by purchase is onerous, while
acquisition by gift is not.
34. Malotte v. Gorton, 75 Wn. 2d 306, 450 P.2d 820 (1969); Bryant v. Stetson &
Post Mill Co., 13 Wash. 692, 43 P. 931 (1896).

35.

Cross, LA. L. REV. at 650.

36. See note 14 supra.
37. Baker v. Murrey, 78 Wash. 241, 138 P. 890 (1914).
38. In Morgan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506, 201 P.2d 976 (1948),
the court held that the husband, as manager and agent of the community, could acquire
real property which is subject to liens, reservations and exception. The court said that it
was only after acquisition, that the wife must join in the execution of a lien or reservation against community real property.
39. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.040 (1959).
40. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(3), (4) (Supp. 1972), supra note 14.
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ticipated" even though she did not sign the formal documents. 41 The
concept of "participation" was broadly applied to include the elements
of authorization, ratification and estoppel.42 In addition, the Washington Supreme Court held that the joinder requirement was for the
protection of the wife and could not be asserted by the purchaser to
nullify his obligation without first giving the wife an opportunity to
affirm the transaction. 43 Under the 1972 amendments, the seller of
realty to a spouse should be treated similarly--"participation" by
both spouses should be enough to make the transaction binding and
the seller should not be able to nullify the community real property
purchase without first giving the "other" spouse an opportunity to affirm.

If both spouses do not "join" or "participate" in the transaction, the
new law should give the nonjoining spouse power to disaffirm the
transaction and recover community funds paid the seller. The pur-

chase transaction, in a community property context, is beyond the

44
power of one spouse acting alone.

41. In this connection, the Washington Supreme Court has stated:
[I]
t is not the rule in this state that a contract for the sale of community real property must be signed by the wife'in order to be binding upon her. We have held it
enough if the contract, when made by the husband, had the sanction and approval of
the wife, or if it was subsequently ratified by her.
Washington State Bank v. Dickson, 35 Wash. 641, 647, 77 P. 1067, 1069 (1904).
42. See In re Horse Heaven Irr. Dist., 19 Wn. 2d 89, 141 P.2d 400 (1943), where the
court held that the wife had ratified the contract to sell. See also Stabbert v. Atlas Imperial Diesel Engine Co., 39 Wn. 2d 789, 238 P.2d 1212 (1951); and Colcord v. Leddy, 4
Wash. 791, 31 P. 320 (1892). In another case, Campbell v. Webber, 29 Wn. 2d 516, 188
P.2d 130 (1947), the court held that the wife was estopped to deny a contract to sell
community real estate where she had indicated her willingness to abide by her husband's
decision and had accepted payments from the purchasers with the knowledge that the
payments were intended as purchase payments. But where the wife had no actual knowledge of the transaction, the Washington Supreme Court has refused to find participation.
Benedict v. Hendrickson, 19 Wn. 2d 452, 143 P.2d 326 (1943). The court in Campbell
also suggested that the wife would be estopped from disaffirming a contract if she should
have spoken but did not, and the purchasers detrimentally relied on her failure to speak.
43. Colcord v. Leddy, 4 Wash. 791, 31 P. 320 (1892).
44. An analogous result was reached in Jarrett v. Arnerich, 44 Wn. 2d 55, 265 P.2d
282 (1954). In Jarrett,the transfer of the community property interest to the contract
vendor was beyond the power of the husband acting alone. The court reached this result
because the husband was in breach of his fiduciary duty to the community property interest in essentially "giving" the purchaser's interest to the vendor and not necessarily
because it was a real property transaction. However, under the old statute the manager-husband could default the installment payment and thereby put the vendor in a position to declare a forfeiture of the purchaser's interest even though the wife disagreed
with the decision to default. See Halvorsen v. Pacific County, 22 Wn. 2d 532, 156 P.2d
907, 158 A.L.R. 555 (1945); Converse v. LaBarge, 92 Wash. 282, 158 P. 958 (1916);
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Confronted with the new joinder requirement in a community
property acquisition, the prospective transferor is potentially in a precarious position. A spouse is always free to engage in a separate property transaction. But after the amendment, if only one spouse enters
into a transaction with a vendor of real property, there is nothing that
inherently establishes the character of the purchaser's act. Certainly
the joinder requirement can preclude a court from presuming the
community character of a real property transaction entered into by
one spouse, but nevertheless the vendor will be bound by the contract.
If there is any applicable presumption, it may be that the acquisition
is separate. From the vendor's viewpoint, it will thus be even more
important under the new amendments to secure both spouses' signatures (or some form of "participation") to get, practically speaking, a
meaningful purchase obligation. However, if the contract recites that
the asset acquired is the community property of the purchaser, the
vendor ought to be able to rescind the contract if the correlative obligation is denied him.4 5 But in the absence of any contract provision
indicating the community character of the transaction, the vendor will
bear both the risk of the purchaser's improper use of community
funds to pay and the risk that the purchaser will be unable to perform
the contract with separate funds. In addition, the vendor must await
later developments before he is able to solidify his position either as a
vendor in an effective transaction or as a vendor with a defaulting
purchaser from whom he will need to extricate himself.
It is also possible that the nonparticipating spouse will decide not to
upset the transaction to the inconvenience of the vendor despite the
improper use of community funds to complete the purchase transaction. At this point there appear to be two possible results as between
the spouses: either the transaction could be confirmed as a community
property acquisition, or a community lien equal to the amount of the
community assets used could be asserted against the separate property
acquired. Existing case law does not furnish any clear guide as to
whether there is a preferred result or as to whether the nonparticipating spouse has an election.
Thygesen v. Neufelder, 9 Wash. 455, 37 P. 672 (1894). This power is modified by the
new statute only to the extent that the wife, as manager, now can use community personal property to prevent the default.
45. For a case which involved rescission under the prior law, see Colcord v. Leddy, 4
Wash. 791, 31 P. 320(1892).
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Probably most real property transactions will be handled as they
have been in the past, with both the husband and the wife signing the
earnest money agreement and, if the purchasers seek financing, both
signing the mortgage or other financing agreement at the insistence of
the lender. Since the purchase of a home is probably the most important single transaction most married couples undertake, the joinder
requirement is useful in precluding the possibility of two inadvertent,
concurrent purchases which otherwise could occur due to the new
equal and independent management power of each spouse.
D. Acquisition or Transfer of Business Assets
An amendment to the original bill has produced a significant ambiguity in the new community property statute. R.C.W. § 26.16.030(6)46
states that if both spouses participate in the management of a community business, neither spouse can acquire, transfer or encumber the
assets (including real estate) or goodwill of the business without the
consent of the other. The proviso of the same paragraph states that if
only one spouse participates in the management of a community business, that spouse without the other's consent can acquire, transfer, or
encumber the assets (including the real estate) or goodwill of the business when the transaction is in the ordinary course of business. But
the statute fails to indicate whether both spouses must consent to such
a transaction not in the ordinary course of business if only one spouse
participates in the management of the business. By negative inference
such a joinder requirement would seem to follow from the proviso of
paragraph (6) declaring that joinder is not required if only one spouse
participates in the business management and the transaction is in the
ordinary course of business. Assuming the drafters intended to require
joinder for a transaction not in the ordinary course of business when
only one spouse participates in the management of the business, this
drafting oversight can be remedied with corrective legislation such as
the following:
(6) Neither spouse shall acquire, purchase, sell, convey, or encumber
the assets, including real estate, or the goodwill of a business where
both spouses participate in its management without the consent of the
other.
46.

WAsH. REv. CODE § 26.16.030(6) (Supp. 1972).
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(7) Neither spouse shall acquire, purchase, sell, convey, or encumber
the assets, including real estate, or the goodwill of a business where
only one of the spouses participates in its management without the
consent of the other: Provided, that where only one spouse participates in such management the participating spouse may, in the ordinary course of business, acquire, purchase, sell, convey, or encumber
the assets, including real estate, or the goodwill of the business without
the consent of the nonparticipating spouse.
"Participation," "consent," and "in the ordinary course of business," as used in R.C.W. § 26.16.030(6), will be difficult to define and
probably will cause a great deal of litigation. Particularly confusing is
the relationship between the term "participate in [the community
business] management" and the concept of "participation" as a substitute for the statutory joinder requirement in transactions involving the
transfer of community real property. 4 7 The confusion is due to the
fact that "participation" as a substitute for joinder is essentially equivalent to tacit consent to the particular transaction.In the context of
the business management provision, "participation" refers to the general management of the business, whereas the term "consent" is used
in referring to particular transactions within the general conduct of
the business. Thus "participation," as related to the joinder requirement, should satisfy only the consent requirement of R.C.W. §
26.16.030(6) and not the requirement of "participation."
The purpose of requiring "participation" in transactions involving
community real estate is to protect the nonacting spouse (and thus the
community) from imprudent and arbitrary decisions involving major
assets of the community. Similarly, the purpose of requiring consent
in transactions involving the community business is to protect the
nonacting spouse (and thus the community) from imprudent and arbitrary decisions involving "blue chip" community assets. In both situations the assets involved probably comprise the foundation of the
community financial structure. Since the requirement of "participation" in real property transactions can be met by ratification, estoppel
or authorization, it certainly follows that the "consent" requirement of

47. For a discussion of "participation" in the real estate transfer context, see note
42 and accompaning text supra. Note that joint participation similarly is required to
transfer household goods. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(5) (Supp. 1972), supra note
14.
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R.C.W. § 26.16.030(6) should be satisfied if the nonacting spouse
authorizes or ratifies the transactions or is estopped to disaffirm the
contract.
Requiring the consent of both spouses in community business transactions predominates in the new paragraph (6), reflecting a policy
judgment that community business transactions should be subject to
joint consent. It is at this point that the word "participate," as used in
R.C.W. § 26.16.030(6), becomes significant. If both spouses "participate" in the community business, both must consent to all transactions
in the ordinary course of business. 48 But what kind of activity constitutes "participation"? If the purpose of the requirement of joint action
in the community business operation is to protect both spouses, it may
be that only minimal involvement in the operation of the business is
enough to require that both consent even to transactions within the
ordinary course of business. For example, keeping the books of the
business may constitute sufficient minimal involvement.
At first glance it may appear that the spouse who principally manages the business will be under an undue burden if he or she is required to secure the consent of the other spouse for each transaction
in the ordinary course of business. However, consent may be either
express or implied. Thus, as a practical matter, the spouse who is only
minimally involved in the operation of the business probably will
be
found to have impliedly consented to the other's actions. The concepts
of authorization, ratification and estoppel must be applicable if this
section is to be at all workable. Otherwise, if "participation in management" is interpreted to require only minimal involvement, the consent requirement will impose a severe burden on the conduct of any
community business. Must the purchaser in a Mom and Pop grocery
store buy his groceries from both spouses for his purchase to be valid?
Similarly, does the milk distributor dare deliver his products to Mom
and Pop without both spouses signing the purchase order? The headache that would fall on both retail purchasers and wholesalers is apparent.
This analysis of the "participation" and "consent" requirements

48. Consent of both spouses, express or implied, is required by the statute for all
non-ordinary business transactions and for ordinary course of business transactions when
the business is managed by both spouses. See WAsH. REv. CODE § 26.16.030(6) (Supp.
1972), supra note 14.
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provides protection for both spouses in transactions involving the
major community assets. By finding that "participation" is satisfied by
minimal involvement, the analysis requires that some form of dual
consent be given to most community business transactions. At the
same time, the analysis permits one spouse to carry on the business in
the ordinary course even though both spouses participate in its management by calling for judicial adoption of an implied consent theory.
Whether a particular transaction is "in the ordinary course of business" will be a difficult issue to resolve. Perhaps the experience of the
phrase "ordinary course of business" in the commercial law will
provide some guidance. 49 Depending on the interpretation given the
phrase, many pre-amendment cases may be of limited precedential
value. For example, in Fields v. Andrus50 the Washington Supreme
Court held that the husband, as manager of the community property,
could bring a new partner into the community business. Is bringing a
new partner into a business in the ordinary course of such business?
The answer is unclear. The ordinary course of business exception reflects a policy judgment that if only one spouse participates in the operation of the business, then it is his or her business acumen that
should govern the ordinary operation of the business. Adequate protection is afforded the nonparticipating spouse by requiring his or her
49. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-102(1). A general definition of "ordinary
course of business" is:
The transaction of business according to the usages and customs of the commercial
world generally or... (in some cases) of the particular individual whose acts are
under consideration.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1249 (rev. 4th ed. 1968), citing Rison v. Knapp, 20 Fed. Cas.
835 (1868), and Christianson v. Farmer's Warehouse Ass'n, 5 N.D. 458, 67 N.W. 300
(1896).
Rison, an early bankruptcy case, focused the meaning of "ordinary course of business" in the bankruptcy context on what was customary business to the particular
person under scrutiny, not to the community at large:
In determining whether a given transaction is made in the ordinary course of business of a party, the question is not whether such transactions are usual in the general conduct of business throughout the community, but whether they are according
to the usual course of business of the particular person whoseconveyance is the subject of investigation.
20 Fed. Cas. at 839. More recent cases tend to define the phrase in terms of specifics
based on the particular factual situation at hand. See, e.g., Coryell v. Bluett, 251 Wis.
458, 29 N.W.2d 741 (1947), and Ostlind v. Ostlind Valve, 178 Ore. 161, 165 P.2d 779
(1946). These later cases indicate that the Rison court's emphasis on the specific practice
of the individual or business involved, rather than the local commercial setting viewed
as a whole, still captures the essence of what is meant by "in the ordinary course of business." It is likely that courts will give consideration to both elements before making a
decision.
50. 20 Wn. 2d 452, 148 P.2d 313 (1944).
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consent in all transactions which are not in the ordinary course of
business. 51
Two final points need be made with reference to the community
business section. First, although the section does not explicitly address
itself to the purchase of a community business, it does state, in part,
"Neither spouse shall acquire, purchase... the assets, including real
estate, and goodwill of the business without the consent of the
other ... ."52 This language along with the policy of protecting the
community "blue chip" assets suggests that both spouses always will
need to consent to an acquisition of a community business. Second,
the proviso to this section expressly states that a spouse who solely
manages a community business may, in the ordinary course of business, acquire and convey real estate, thereby creating an exception to
the general real property joinder requirement of paragraphs (3) and
(4).53

II.

MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSITION OF
COMMUNITY PROPERTY

A.

In General

The 1972 amendments confer upon the wife managing power equal
to that previously held by the husband alone. While the previous rule
had been that the husband had to act for the best interests of the
community in a business sense, 54 the rule that the manager must act
"'for the community and in the community interest" now applies to
both husband and wife.5 5 This precludes either spouse from making
effective gifts of the community personal property without the consent
56
of the other.
Prior to 1972, good faith rather than good judgment was the test of
whether the husband was meeting his managerial responsibilities. "[S] o
long as he exercises his discretion in the community interest as he
51. For example, a transfer of all the business assets would not be a transfer in the
ordinary course of business.
52. WASH. Rnv. CODE § 26.16.030(6) (Supp. 1972), supra note 14.
53. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.030(3) and (4) (Supp. 1972), supra note 14.
54. Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Outler, 172 Wash. 540, 20 P.2d 1110 (1933).
55. Hanley v. Most, 9 Wn. 2d 429, 461, 115 P.2d 933,946 (1941) (emphasis added).
See also Jarrett v. Arnerich, 44 Wn. 2d 55, 265 P.2d 282 (1954).
56. Prior to the 1972 amendments, this was a limitation placed on the husband by
case law. See Sun Life Assurance Co. v. Outler, 172 Wash. 540, 20 P.2d 1110 (1933).
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sees it, the wife is without power to frustrate his acts." 57 This rule
stemmed from the husband's sweeping power as statutory manager.
Since the wife had no managing power, she obviously could not frustrate her husband's community management decisions unless she
could show bad faith.5 8 Now that the wife has equal managing power
the question arises whether good judgment rather than good faith is
the standard by which management decisions are to be judged. Does
the wife's newly acquired managing power confer upon her greater
standing to object to her husband's managment decisions and vice
versa? It should not. If the answer were otherwise, courts would be
asked to choose between alternative business decisions and thus would
undertake to decide what is in the best interests of the community.
This is impractical and undesirable. Absent some evidence of bad
faith, a dispute over what is best for the community is nothing more
than an internal disagreement between husband and wife. A contrary

Under the new law, this limitation is placed expressly on both spouses. See WASH. REV.
CODE § 26.16.030(2) (Supp. 1972), which states: "Neither spouse shall give community
property without the express or implied consent of the other."
A recurring related problem concerns the rights of the community or one of the
spouses when the separate property of one of the spouses is improved or encumbrances
thereon are paid off with community funds or the separate funds of the other spouse.
There was some undercurrent in the cases that if the husband was the actor, a gift may
be assumed, whereas if the wife was the actor, an equitable lien attached to protect her
contribution. See In re Hickman's Estate, 41 Wn. 2d 519, 250 P.2d 524 (1952); In re
Hart, 149 Wash. 600, 271 P. 886 (1928); Legg v. Legg, 34 Wash. 132, 75 P. 130 (1904).
It would appear that with the wife's new management power a gift will be presumed
when she uses either her separate funds or community funds to improve the husband's
separate property. Where community funds are used, what appears to be involved is a
joint consent to make a gift of the community funds. Policy considerations support such
a presumption because the husband will be assumed to consent to a transaction benefiting himself. However, if there is in fact no intent to confer a gift, a community lien will
attach. See Hickman's Estate, supra. On the other hand, when either spouse uses community funds to improve his or her separate property, an equitable lien running in favor
of the community should attach. In this instance the facts do not raise prima facie an
assumption that the other spouse consents to making a gift of the community funds. To
remove the equitable lien, there must be a demonstration that the other spouse consented to make a gift.
In one case, Johnson v. DarDenne, 161 Wash. 496, 296 P. 1105 (193 1), the court declared that the husband's purchase with community funds of articles of personal adornment particularly suitable for use by the wife would be found, on slight evidence, to be a
gift. The new statute should make this rule reciprocal so that now either spouse will on
slight evidence be found to have made a gift of community funds when he (or she) purchases an article of personal adornment with community funds which will be worn primarily by the other spouse. The rule now might be that an assumption of gift attaches
because the benefitted spouse may be assumed to consent to a transaction that benefits
himself (or herself).
57. Cross, LA. L. REV. at 642.
58. Cf. Hanley v. Most, 9 Wn. 2d 429, 115 P.2d 933 (1941).
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conclusion would be inconsistent with the traditional community
property concept that only a few important transactions should require participation by both spouses. As a practical matter, if either
spouse could contest the judgment of the other, joint participation by
the spouses always would be necessary before a third party could
safely transact business with the community.
B.

SeparatedSpouses

In Dizard & Getty v. Damson59 the Washington Supreme Court
held that the husband's power to manage the community property
continued after he was separated permanently from his wife and until
their divorce was final. Community liability for the husband's acts was
held to extend to the community property awarded the wife by the
divorce decree. In Dizard, counsel for the wife did not urge the court
to restrict the husband's management power to that which was necessary under the circumstances of the separation. The scope of the husband's management power after a separation is still undefined. The
wife's new management power under the 1972 amendments makes
this inquiry even more complex. It is suggested that both spouses'
power to manage community personal property during a period of
"living separate and apart" should not be as plenary as during the existence of the community relationship.
Of course, any restrictions on the spouses' management powers
should be defined by necessity and applied to protect the interests of
the spouses and third parties. There is nothing in the "living separate
and apart" situation to necessitate altering the requirement of joinder
in transactions involving the transfer of community household goods
or community real estate. However, there is a need to restrict a spouse
from vindictively selling community personal property which is obviously a personal item (e.g., woodcutting equipment or knitting supplies) of the other spouse. Balanced against the need to protect estranged spouses from vindictive mates is the policy of protecting bona
fide purchasers. To say the least, it is unreasonable to force an innocent purchaser to bear the loss when estranged spouses behave maliciously. A purchaser should be forced to bear the loss of a wrongful

59.

63 Wn. 2d 526, 387 P.2d 964(1964).
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sale only when he can be charged fairly with notice that the selling
spouse may be abusing his authority. Where the purchaser has no
knowledge of the separation and has no reason to suspect marital
problems, notice should not be imputed to him. If the purchaser is
aware of the separation but the articles involved do not create a reasonable suspicion that they have been used primarily by the nonselling
spouse, notice again should not be imputed to the purchaser. In this
instance, the duty of the nonselling spouse to protect his interest in the
property is greater than the duty of the purchaser to inquire into the
authority of the spouse making the sale. However, where the purchaser knows of the separation and the articles for sale create a reasonable suspicion that they were used primarily by the nonselling
spouse, e.g., a husband selling knitting equipment or a wife selling
woodcutting tools, then it seems fair to impose upon the purchaser a
duty to inquire into the seller's authority to make the sale and to make
the purchaser bear the loss if he fails to do so. This conclusion is suggested by the Dizard court's statement that the purchaser cannot ar60
bitrarily assume that the selling spouse's authority to sell exists.
C.

Emergency Power

Prior to achieving her new status as a co-manager of the marital
community, the wife had an inherent "emergency power" to act for
the community. Emergencies were found during "a serious absence of
the husband" 6 1 and where "the husband had been reduced to a tragic
specimen, totally incompetent to conduct the affairs of the marital
community." 62 Even with both spouses now acting as equal managers,
the need for an inherent emergency power in these types of situations
continues. Therefore, where the law requires joint action by both
spouses, an "inherent [emergency] power to act on behalf of the
community" 63 should exist in either spouse when the other has become incompetent, has deserted, or for any other reason has been
absent for a prolonged period of time without communication.

60.
61.
62.
63.
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Id. at 531, 387 P.2d at 967.
Marstonv. Rue, 92Wash. 129, 133, 159 P. 111, 113(1916).
Foster v. Williams, 4 Wn. App. 659, 661, 484 P.2d 438, 440 (1971).
Id. at 662, 484 P.2d at 440.
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D.

Litigation

As part of the thrust for equality between husband and wife, the
legislature changed the law to permit management of community
litigation by either the husband or the wife.64 Previously only the
husband could bring an action on behalf of the community, and the
husband was the only necessary party in any litigation involving
community personal property interests. Under the new law, in actions
for personal injuries to a spouse or in actions for compensation for
services rendered, the injured spouse or the spouse who rendered the
services is a necessary party. Where community rights in personal property are involved, either spouse can bring suit on behalf of the community even though the other spouse objects. 65 The fact that the wife
can now bring suit over the objection of her husband is a major
change in Washington law.
R.C.W. § 26.16.030(5)66 provides that neither spouse can create a
security interest (other than a purchase money security interest) in or
sell household goods, furnishings or appliances without the other
spouse's joining in the transaction. This provision is similar to the old
and amended provisions regarding transfers of community real property. In actions involving community real property both spouses are
necessary parties. 6 7 The Washington Supreme Court so held because
the power to maintain such an action included the power to compromise and "the effect of that compromise might be to effectually dispossess the community of the land, or, at least to seriously encumber
'

it. 68

This reasoning now should be equally applicable to the desig-

nated personal property, making both spouses necessary parties in actions involving community household goods, furnishings and appliances.
64.

WASH. REV. CODE § 4.08.030 (Supp. 1972):

Either husband or wife may sue on behalf of the community: Provided,That
(1) When the action is for personal injuries, the spouse having sustained personal
injuries is a necessary party;
(2) When the action is for compensation for services rendered, the spouse having
rendered the services is a necessary party.
65. This is not true, of course, where the personal property involved is a household
good, appliance or furnishing or where the suit is brought because of an injury received
or a service performed and the spouse receiving the injury or performing the service
chooses not to bring the suit.
66.

See note 14 supra.

67.
68.

Lownsdale v. Gray's Harbor Boom Co., 21 Wash. 542, 58 P. 663 (1899).
Id. at 544, 58 P. at 644.
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Previously a judgment entered in an action against the husband
presumptively was a community obligation, apparently on the theory
that the cause of action probably arose out of an exercise of his managing power. 69 Thus, it was not necessary to join both spouses in actions not involving real property claims. Under the amendments the
reasoning is equally applicable to the wife's obligatory acts except
where joint action of both spouses is required. The community interests of the spouse not named in a suit will be protected through a right
to intervene under R.C.W. § 4.08.040.70 Prior to the 1972 act, this
provision applied only to the wife-the husband had to be named in
any suit involving the community. The provision was interpreted to
mean that the wife could intervene only where her separate property
interests might be prejudiced by the suit.7 1 With her newly conferred
capacity to represent the community in litigation, it is preferable to
conclude that this provision will be read to permit the wife (or the
husband) to intervene in a lawsuit involving community assets to protect her (or his) interest in those assets. This interpretation will enable
either spouse to protect against an adverse community consequence
when the other spouse, for whatever reason, chooses not to do so.
Since all judgments obtained against either spouse are only presumptively community obligations, it is to a plaintiffs advantage to
join both spouses in the suit and secure a determination of the community character of the obligation in the original action. If both
spouses are not joined and the non-named spouse does not intervene,
that spouse may resist a levy upon community property by the successful plaintiff and, at that time, litigate the question of community
liability vel non. This has been the law;7 2 there is nothing to indicate a
different rule with the 1972 amendments.

69. LaFramboise v. Schmidt, 42 Wn. 2d 198, 254 P.2d 485 (1953).
70. The relevant language in that section reads: "[E] ach spouse may defend in all
cases in which he or she is interested, whether that spouse is sued with the other spouse or
not." WASH. REV. CODE § 4.08.040 (Supp. 1972).
71. See Erhardt v. Havens, Inc. 53 Wn. 2d 103, 330 P.2d 1010 (1958); LaFramboise
v. Schmidt, 42 Wn. 2d 198, 254 P.2d 485 (1953); Merritt v. Newkirk, 155 Wash. 517,
285 P. 442 (1930); Schneider v. Biberger, 76 Wash. 504, 136 P. 701 (1913).
72. See Merritt v. Newkirk, 155 Wash. 517, 285 P. 442 (1930); Brotton v. Langert,
I Wash. 73, 23 P. 688 (1890).
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E.

Conveyance or Encumbrance of Community Household Goods

The 1972 amendments continue the requirement that both spouses
join in the execution of a conveyance or encumbrance of community
real property.7 3 A similar requirement of joinder is placed on the sale
or encumbrance of certain types of community personal property:
household goods, furnishings and appliances. 74 However, this provi-

sion does not prevent one spouse from acquiring an equity in household goods, furnishings and appliances by creating a security interest
75
in the seller.
The requirement of joinder in the sale or encumbrance of household goods, furnishings or appliances provides equality, and although
the requirement provides a new protection, "equality... [is] more

important than protection. '7 6 The language of R.C.W. § 26.16.030(5) seems to suggest that a sale or encumbrance of the specified types of community personal property can be accomplished only

by a writing. However, several considerations militate against such a
conclusion. First, the statutory language is, "unless the other spouse
7 7 and
joins in executing the security agreement of bill of sale, ifany,"1
the general proscription of the statute is that "neither spouse shall
create a security interest.., in, or sell... unless the other spouse

See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(3) (Supp. 1972), supra note 14.
74. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(5) (Supp. 1972), supra note 14. The joint action
necessary to transfer some personal property might expand the area in which the conflict
between the immunity of community property for separate obligations and the antenuptial alimony or support obligation can arise. The distinction between the result in Fisch
v. Marler, 1 Wn. 2d 698, 97 P.2d 147 (1939), permitting, and that in Stafford v. Stafford, 10 Wn. 2d 649, 117 P.2d 753 (1941), not permitting enforcement of -the antenuptial claim against community property could now also apply to household goods, furnishings and appliances. The possibility is only noted here.
75. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(5) (Supp. 1972) provides that "[n] either spouse
shall create a security interest, other than a purchase money security interest.. ." (emphasis added). This has previously been the rule regarding the acquisition of community
real property by the husband.. See Baker-v. Murrey, 78 Wash. 241, 138 P. 890 (1914).
Contrast the change in the rule for acquisition of community real property, discussed in
the text accompanying note 37 supra.
There is a rather interesting possibility under WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(5) (Supp.
1972) that either spouse could contract to buy a new piano, but neither (alone) could
trade in the old piano on the purchase price (assuming of course that a piano is a household good or furnishing). Hence the spouses could end up with two pianos, both community property.
76. Cross, WASH. ST. BAR NEWS at 9.
77. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030(5) (Supp. 1972) (emphasis added), supra note 14.
73.
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joins ...." Second, the thrust of the amendments is for equality between the spouses rather than general substantive change. Third, the
language of this paragraph does not preclude permitting joint action
to be achieved through "participation" of one or both rather than
signing. A comparison of the language of R.C.W. § 26.16.030(5) with
that in the earlier R.C.W. § 26.16.040 strongly suggests that such a
construction was contemplated.78 Such a construction certainly would
not conflict with the section's apparent "protection" purpose, as "participation" requires a knowing acquiescence in the moving spouse's
79
acts.
Probably the most litigated question under R.C.W. § 26.16.030(5),
if not under the whole community property statute, will be whether a
particular item of community personal property is a household good,
appliance or furnishing. This is not the place to annotate the cases
holding what is or is not a household good, 80 but as a general rule a
household good, appliance or furnishing "includes every article of a
permanent nature that [is] used or purchased or otherwise
acquired.., for... use in and about the house, excluding articles of
'8 1
consumption.
F.

Involuntary Disposition

1.

Contract

Prior to the adoption of the 1972 amendment, liability for contracts of the husband could extend to community property, but not to
the separate property of the wife. 82 However, the husband was not
afforded the same protection. If the wife incurred separate and com-

78. The language of the earlier section 26.16.040 provided that "the wife [must]
join with him [husband] in executing the deed or other instrument of conveyance ....
The language in section 26.16.030(5) is almost identical. It provides that "the other
spouse [must] join in executing the security agreement or bill of sale ...
79. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
80. A compilation of the cases can be found under the term "Household Goods" in
19A WORDS AND PHRASES 510-15 (1970).
81. In re Mitchell's Will, 38 N.Y.S.2d 673, 674 (Sur. Ct. 1942).
82. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.020 (1959). See U.S. Lumber Co. v. McDonald, 68
Wn. 2d 741, 415 P.2d 77 (1966); Yakima Plumbing Supply Co. v. Johnson, 149 Wash.
257, 270 P. 829 (1928); Northern Bank & Trust Co. v. Graves, 79 Wash. 411, 140 P.
328 (1914).
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munity liability, there is authority83 that the husband would also be
separately liable. The basis of this liability has never been clear,8 4 but
it seems to rest on the husband's capacity as community manager. No
other explanation accounts for the husband's being separately liable for
the wife's obligations, while the wife is free of separate liability for the
husband's obligations. Since the wife now has an equal managing
power, the rule surely has been changed in one of two ways. Either
each spouse will be separately liable when the other incurs an obligation which is separate and community in character, or neither spouse
will be separately liable for the acts of the other. The correct conclusion depends on the effect of the new amendments on the theories
underlying the husband's previous separate liability.
Two theories supported the husband's potential liability for the acts
of his wife. First it could be argued that since the husband was the
sole manager of community affairs, the wife could obligate community property only as an agent for her husband. Thus, if the agent's
(wife's) conduct incurred liability for her and the community property,
it followed that the principal (husband) should be separately liable as
well. Second, it could be argued that the husband, as the sole manager, had an affirmative duty to control imposition of liability on the
community property. Where this duty was breached and the community liability was incurred through a benefit received, the manager
(husband) also should be separately liable.
Regardless of which rationale is approved, the basis for the husband's separate liability vanishes under the new law. Since the wife is
now an equal manager of the community affairs, she no longer must
be her husband's agent in order to act on behalf of the community.
Similarly, since the husband is no longer the sole manager, his affirmative duty to control the acts of his wife disappears.
Conferring equal managing power upon the wife does not seem to
confer upon her a corresponding separate liability for the separate and
community liability incurred by her husband. Rather than extending
the rationale for the husband's earlier separate liability, the new
statute seems to eliminate it altogether. Thus, under the new statute,

83.

See Lucci v. Lucci, 2 Wn. 2d 624, 99 P.2d 393 (1940); cf.Colagrossi v. Hen-

drickson, 50 Wn. 2d 266, 310 P.2d 1072 (1957).
84. See Cross, IA. L. REv. at 664, and Cross, WASH. ST. BAR NEws at 12.
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each spouse should be liable separately for his own acts which produce community liability, but neither spouse should be liable separately for the acts of the other which produce separate and community
liability. If this analysis is correct, this will probably be the most significant substantive change in the liability of husbands and wives.
2.

Tort
86
The Washington Supreme Court in Werker v. Knox 8 5 noted that:

[T] he trend of the law has not been toward relieving the community
from liability for the torts of its members, but has been quite definitely
in the direction of finding ways and means of imposing such liabilities
upon the community.
While strictly speaking there has been no presumption that a tort
committed by the husband is for the benefit of the community, as a
practical matter the husband's managing power has been extensive
enough to enable the court to impose community liability by finding
that some accrued community benefit or community purpose was involved.8 7 Prior to enactment of the 1972 amendments, it was more
difficult to impose community liability when the wife was the acting
spouse. Community liability for her acts was predicated upon the
family expense statute,8 8 the "family car doctrine," 89 or an agency
between the husband and wife. With the wife attaining the status of
equal manager, the same tests should be applied to the wife's tortious
conduct as previously applied to the husband's. Thus, community liability may be found when: (1) either spouse acts for the benefit of the
community or (2) the act is one within the course of community business or activity.9 0

85.

197 Wash. 453, 85 P.2d 1041 (1938).

86.
87.

Id. at 456, 85 P.2d at 1042.
See, e.g., LaFramboise v. Schmidt, 42 Wn. 2d 198, 254 P.2d 485 (1953); Mc-

Henry v. Short, 29 Wn. 2d 263, 186 P.2d 900 (1947).
88. See Werker v. Knox, 197 Wash. 453, 85 P. 1041 (1938).
89. Perren v. Press, 196 Wash. 14, 81 P.2d 867 (1938).
90. LaFramboise v. Schmidt, 42 Wn. 2d 198, 254 P.2d 485 (1953); McHenry v.
Short, 29 Wn. 2d 263, 186 P.2d 900 (1947); Bergman v. State, 187 Wash. 622, 60 P.2d
699 (1936); Newbury v. Remington, 184 Wash. 665, 52 P.2d 312 (1935).
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m. RETROACTIVE OR PROSPECTIVE APPLICATION?
A final question concerns whether and to what extent the 1972
amendments will be applied retroactively. Specifically, can a wife exercise her newly acquired management power over community assets
acquired before the effective date of the amendments? Except for a
highly criticized line of California case authority- the question could be
answered unequivocally in the affirmative.
The validity of the California doctrine against retroactive application of amendments has been questioned by legal scholars both on and
off the California bench. 9 1 The doctrine originated in an 1897 case,
Spreckels v. Spreckels,9 2 which involved an 1891 statute prohibiting a
gift of community property by the husband without the wife's consent.
Before the 1891 statute, the husband's power to convey community
assets was not limited by any rights of the wife; his power over the
community property was equal to that over his separate property. In
Spreckels the court held that the statute could not operate constitutionally as to property acquired before the passage of the statute, reasoning that the wife had a "mere expectancy" in the community property and that the husband's plenary control over community assets
was a vested property right which could not be impaired by the
statute.
The Washington Supreme Court never has approved the premises
underlying ihe California doctrine. Rather, the Washington Supreme
Court has long held that the wife has a vested interest and not a "mere
expectancy" in the community property. 93 In addition, Washington
case law established long ago that the husband's community management power is a "mere trust conferred upon him as a member and
head of the community in trust for the community, and not a proprie-

91. See Justice Traynor's concurring opinion in Boyd v. Oser, 23 Cal. 2d 613, 623,
145 P.2d 312,318 (1944). See also Armstrong, Prospective Application of Changes in
Community Property Control-Rule in Community Property Control-Rule of Property of Constitutional Necessity? 33 CALIF. L. Rav. 476 (1945); Schreter, "QuasiCommunity Property" in Conflict of Laws, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 206 (1962); Comment,
Community and Separate Property: Constitutionality of Legislation Decreasing Husband's Power of Control Over Property Already Acquired, 27 CALIF. L. REv. 49
(1938); Note, RetroactiveApplication of California'sCommunity PropertyStatutes, 18
STAN. L. REV. 514 (1966).
92. 116 Cal. 339, 48 P. 228 (1897).
93. See In re Coffey's Estate, 195 Wash. 379, 81 P.2d 283 (1938).
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tary right." 941n Mabie v. Whittaker9 5 the Washington Supreme Court
held that a 1871 statute requiring joinder to convey community realty
was effective as to community realty acquired earlier when such
joinder was not required. The court concluded: "It [the 1871 act] did
96
not make the interest of either spouse greater or less."
In Arnett v. Reade97 the United States Supreme Court ruled on the
constitutional limitations of a New Mexico statute similar to that involved in Mabie. The New Mexico Supreme Court had held that the
new statute could not apply constitutionally to real property acquired
before its enactment because such application would impair vested
property rights in violation of the due process clause. The United
98
States Supreme Court reversed. Similarly, in Warburton v. White
the United States Supreme Court affirmed a Washington Supreme
Court decision holding that a statute giving each spouse testamentary
power over one half of the community property could be applied retroactively, reasoning that the husband's management power was not a
property right but rather stemmed from his capacity as "agent of the
community." 99
Nothing in Washington or federal law should prohibit application
of the 1972 amendments to property acquired before the effective

94. Holyoke v. Jackson, 3 Wn. Ter. 235, 239, 3 P. 841, 842 (1882). In Holyoke the
husband sought to convey community real estate without his wife's joinder. Under the
1873 act he could convey without herjoinder, but an 1879 act restricted his power of disposition by requiring joinder of the wife in conveyances of community real property.
The property involved was purchased before enactment of the 1879 act but the attempt
to convey was made after its passage. The husband argued that he had vested rights
under the laws of 1873 which could not be divested by the 1879 act. The court rejected
the argument.
The idea that the community management power is a "trust" and not a vested property right is more consistent with the concept of community property. Briefly, the community property system is based on the' principle that all acquisitions during marriage
are the fruits of the joint efforts and contributions of both spouses and thus should belong to them jointly. This means that the spouses share equally, and one spouse should
not acquire a greater property interest in the community treasury than the other. Thus,
the management power which previously was located in only one spouse constituted a
trusteeship and not an additional share in the community treasury. As one author concludes, "Equality is the cardinal precept of the community property system." Vaughn,
The Policy of Community Property and Inter-Spouse Transactions, 19 BAYLOR L. REV.
20, 26-27 (1967). See generally DEFUNIAK & VAUGHN at 23-28.
95. 10 Wash. 656, 39 P. 172 (1895).
96. Id. at 658, 39 P. at 174.
97. 220 U.S. 311 (1911).
98. 18 Wash. 511, 52 P. 233 (1898), aff'd, 176 U.S. 484(1900).
99. Id. at 494.
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date of the new law. However, this does not mean that the effectiveness of all transactiops consummated before the 1972 amendments is
to be measured by the new rules. Earlier transactions may have created vested property rights (in third persons ordinarily) which consti-

tutionally cannot be disturbed.
While the substantive rights of pre-amendment transactions will
have to be measured by the earlier law, litigation arising hereafter will
be controlled by those procedural changes of the new law. For instance, the wife should be able to enforce community rights and where
now required both spouses should be joined to defend the community
interests. There is no reason to restrict the immediate effectiveness of

the procedural changes, for these changes do not interfere with substantive rights but merely alter the procedural rules by which such
rights can be enforced. How the spouses enforce or defend their rights
is essentially immaterial to third parties. 100

100. Conversely, where joinder of the spouses is required by the new law, e.g., litigation involving household goods, a third party should be able to assert the failure to
join necessary parties if both spouses have not been joined. But see Lownsdale v. Gray's
Harbor Boom Co., 21 Wash. 542, 58 P. 663 (1899). At odds with Lownsdale is Colcord
v. Leddy, 4 Wash. 791, 31 P. 320 (1892), where the court stated that since joinder requirements are for the protection of the nonacting spouse, a third person cannot disaffirm a contract for failure to join both spouses without first requesting proper execution
of the contract. Arguably, Lownsdale can be distinguished from Colcord on the ground
that Colcord involved parties to a contract and not parties to a suit. However, substantively the cases contrast with one another. The principle that a third party should not be
able to nullify his obligations without first giving the spouses an opportunity to meet the
requirements of the statute, where the statute is designed for their protection and not his,
is as applicable to litigation procedures as to contract rights.
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